I INTRODUCTION
Indigenous policy in Australia has changed a great deal over the last two decades. One of the more signifi cant changes has been an increased focus on economic development and participation in the 'mainstream economy'. It is in this context that the Australian government promotes the adoption of township leases by Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory, a reform introduced by the Howard government in 2006 following a contentious debate about communal ownership of Indigenous land. In the period since, governments of both persuasions have put considerable eff ort and resources into the reforms and numerous reports have described a need for further township leases so as to 'facilitate better economic development and home ownership outcomes for residents'. 1 The current Minister for Indigenous Aff airs, Nigel Scullion, goes so far as to argue that township leasing 'has brought about change unlike any seen before in remote Aboriginal communities'.
2 Pointing to developments in Wurrumiyanga, the fi rst township lease community, he reports that it is 'the fi rst time we have seen local ownership of homes and businesses on this scale in an Aboriginal community in the Northern Territory '. 3 This article considers the true impact of township leasing on economic activity in Aboriginal communities. Taking Wurrumiyanga as a case study, it tests the government's claim that township leases bring about unprecedented change. It also clarifi es the particular way in which township leasing has altered the economic circumstances of communities and describes how this compares to alternative approaches. For there is more than one way in which reforms to land tenure might attempt to support economic development in communities on Aboriginal land. Like many other areas of policy, there will be competing views about when, or whether, reform is necessary, and about which reform is best. It is inevitable that any approach will result in winners and losers. The article attempts to set out the options in a way that enables informed discussion about their consequences. This is relevant not just to township lease communities, but 1 Australian Government, 'Our North, Our Future: White Paper on Developing Northern Australia' to all residential communities on Indigenous land in Australia where land tenure reform is being considered.
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It is argued here that for residential communities on Indigenous land there is a choice, and often a tension, between two basic approaches to reform, which are described here as a landowner-driven approach and an occupier-driven approach. In short, under a landowner-driven approach, reforms are introduced in a way that maximises fi nancial returns for the underlying landowners, which in the Northern Territory is usually the traditional owners for that particular country.
Under an occupier-driven approach, the focus is instead on providing occupiers with a set of property rights that best enable them to engage in economic activity. A fuller explanation of these terms, and of the relationship between landowners and occupiers, is provided in Part II.
For the most part, township leasing -in common with most other recent reforms -has implemented a landowner-driven approach to reform. This has ongoing consequences for relationships, governance and economic activity in those communities. Once implemented, it is very diffi cult to switch from one approach to the other. Due to the way in which Indigenous land reform has been debated in Australia, there has been almost no discussion of the benefi ts and risks of each approach.
This article is partly a corrective. In its publications, the Australian government routinely suggests that township leases implement an occupier-driven approach to development. For example, the Closing the Gap Report for 2016 states that: t Township leases are a lever for economic development, delivering long-term tradeable tenure to underpin commercial activities and home ownership. They simplify leasing and land use across a whole town and makes it possible for individuals to obtain long-term subleases to support a loan. 5 Below, it is explained why such statements are so misleading. The primary economic impact of existing township leases has been to create a revenue stream for the underlying landowners through rent on subleases. The introduction of 'long-term tradeable tenure', or of individuals obtaining 'long-term subleases to support a loan', has been the rare exception and certainly not the norm.
Beyond this, the article is also an attempt to reframe discussion about tenure reform in communities on Indigenous land in a manner that is accurate and accessible, and aids with the task of understanding the real issues that arise. From the beginning, debate about township leasing -and Indigenous land reform more generally -has been highly politicised, which has often led to issues being presented and contested in abstract terms. This article instead tries to make clear the day-to-day impact of the reforms and what is particular about the way they have been implemented. To that end, it introduces some concepts and explanatory devices that have not been used previously. 6 When the article returns to a broader discussion of the consequences of reform, it describes how the issues do not fall along neat ideological lines.
The next section -Part II -sets out the background to the reforms by describing the circumstances of communities on Aboriginal land historically and what this means for the introduction of land reform. It also introduces the concept of a 'leasehold spectrum' to clarify the available options when granting formal rights to occupiers. Part III describes outcomes under the township lease in Wurrumiyanga, and clarifi es the particular way in which subleases have been granted. Part IV teases out some of the consequences of taking a landowner-driven or occupier-driven approach. Part V then provides a discussion, addressing such questions as which approach is likely to lead to greater economic development, how issues of cultural compatibility arise and the likely impact of reforms on the balance of relationships in communities on Aboriginal land.
II BACKGROUND TO THE REFORMS A Communities on Aboriginal land A
Consider the following scenario: a residential community of a few hundred mostly Aboriginal people is situated on Aboriginal land. The land itself is owned by a legal entity called a 'Land Trust', which holds title on behalf of those Aboriginal people whose land it is under traditional law. 7 This group is known as the 'traditional Aboriginal owners' and it contains a combination of senior and more junior members. As people are born, grow up and die, the membership and dynamics of the ownership group change. Importantly, not all Aboriginal people who live in the community are necessarily traditional Aboriginal owners for that particular land. While it may be their home, in many communities there will be Aboriginal residents who are not regarded as being members of the traditional landowning group. It is noted that residential communities (also called settlements or townships) are a special case, in that the matters that need to be addressed are slightly diff erent to those aff ecting Indigenous land outside of communities. The relationship between residence and traditional ownership is complex and is discussed further in Part III.
In addition to housing, the community itself contains such services as a school, council offi ce and aged care facility and a few small-scale enterprises such as a store, an art centre and visitor accommodation. All of the buildings in the community have been allocated to particular organisations and families, referred to in this article as the 'occupiers', but for historic reasons the arrangements for doing so are informal. That is, most occupiers have never applied for or been granted a set of formal rights such as a lease, and no other legal mechanisms have been developed to formalise their rights.
This, in simplifi ed form, describes the situation in most communities on Aboriginal land 9 in the Northern Territory prior to the introduction of reforms such as township leasing over the last decade. The actual make-up of communities varies considerably, not least with respect to size and the range of facilities that have been built. However, the practice of using informal arrangements to allocate land and infrastructure has been widespread, not just in the Northern Territory but in communities on Indigenous land around Australia.
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The eff ect of reforms such as township leasing has been to formalise the rights of occupiers in these communities. There are several ways in which this can be done and a key question becomes: how can tenure arrangements be formalised so as to best support economic development? This is not the only issue that arises: others include governance, the protection of vulnerable groups in the reform process, addressing the impact of historical displacement and the impact of new arrangements on existing cultural practices. Some of those issues have been addressed elsewhere; 11 the focus of this article is economic development.
B The Problem with a Dualistic Approach to Debate
To its detriment, debate about Indigenous land reform in Australia has often been framed in terms of dualisms. The most common has been the use of terms such as 'communal ownership' to describe existing arrangements and 'individual ownership' or 'private property' to describe the intended outcome of land reform. This was particularly common when township leasing was fi rst introduced in 2006, 12 but at times also continues today. For example, one of the core recommendations of the Forrest Review in 2014 was to enable 'individual ownership of land' as 'individual land title underpins all advanced economies '. 13 In 2015, the White Paper on Developing Northern Australia spoke of the need to 'increase individual property rights in township areas for willing Indigenous communities'. 14 A slightly diff erent dualism has been used by the Australian government as a type of explanatory device. In the course of describing why Indigenous land reform is necessary, it has often referred to a need for 'secure tenure'. The existing arrangements, it has argued, failed to provide for 'secure tenure', whereas land reform will enable it. While it has never provided a clear explanation of what 'secure tenure' means, the government has attributed a wide range of benefi ts to its introduction, including greater investment.
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One problem with this dualistic approach to debate is that it suggests that the existing arrangements are uniform and that there is a single and obvious reform outcome. Neither is true. Historically, arrangements have varied between diff erent types of infrastructure, as well as between land inside of residential communities and other areas of Aboriginal land. For example, the arrangements with respect to a police station or school in an Aboriginal community were diff erent to those with respect to housing for Aboriginal residents. 16 And far from there being a single model of reform, tenure arrangements can be altered and formalised in any number of diff erent ways. As this article illustrates, land reform involves a series of complex decisions.
A further problem with this terminology is the extent to which it can mislead. References to the introduction of 'individual ownership' suggest a move towards ownership of property by individuals, which has been extremely rare. The majority of leases and subleases created as a result of recent reforms have been granted to government agencies, shire councils and non-government organisations. This development is not well captured by references to either 'individual ownership' or 'secure tenure'.
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The more accurate terminology is that of 'formalisation', however this too has limitations. Employed simply, it might also suggest a dualism -whereby formal tenure is good and informal tenure is bad, or vice versa. Used more broadly it is very open, in that formalisation can take so many diff erent forms that little clarity is conveyed by descriptions of a shift to more formal tenure. So how to meaningfully and helpfully describe the choices that are available?
To begin, there are two main decisions to be made when introducing formal tenure arrangements in a community on Aboriginal land: to whom the grant of formal tenure is made, and on what terms. The fi rst requires little explanation; it simply refers to the identity of the people or organisations who are granted the formal rights. The second of these decisions, the terms upon which grants are made, is a little more complicated and the next section clarifi es the range of options.
C The Leasehold Spectrum
In addition to Aboriginal residents (some of whom are traditional owners, others of whom are not), larger residential communities on Aboriginal land typically contain a variety of organisations such as government departments and agencies, service-providing NGOs and small-scale enterprises such as a corporation owning the community store. 18 An important issue when formalising tenure arrangements in communities is the extent to which there is a transfer of formal property rights from the underlying landowners to each occupier. There can be a complete transfer, where land is divided up into portions and occupiers are granted freehold ownership of each lot. Or there can be a more contained transfer, where occupiers are granted a lease or sublease. In 2014, the Queensland government introduced legislation that enables some Indigenous land in that state to be divided up and converted to ordinary freehold. 19 That legislation only commenced in 2015 and has not yet been used, and there is no equivalent in other Australian jurisdictions. To date, the preferred approach has been to formalise tenure arrangements through leases and subleases. This avoids having to extinguish underlying ownership of land by the Indigenous group, which has been an issue of signifi cant concern for many Indigenous people.
Electing to use leasehold rather than freehold is not the end of the matter as leases and subleases vary considerably with respect to the extent they convey rights to the occupier. In the Australian Capital Territory, for example, the Crown retains underlying title and 'landowners' are granted long-term, transferable leases.
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Those leases are then bought, sold and mortgaged in a very similar manner to freehold. At the other end of the scale are leases such as a residential tenancy or a short-term retail lease, where the rights granted to the tenant are far more limited.
Clearly, the way in which leases are drafted will have an impact on how economic development occurs. To illustrate the range of options available here, this article 
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It is described as a spectrum because in each case there is a range of possibilities. The duration might be from a week or a year through to 99 years. The amount of ongoing rent can be zero, 21 nominal, subsidised or market rent. 22 There may be a clause prohibiting transfer of the lease, providing that it can only be transferred to certain persons, or with consent, or allowing it to be transferred to anyone. There can be a long list of other restrictions on the way the subject land can be used, or none at all. And a lease can be drafted such that a breach of its terms can readily result in the cancellation of the lease, or in a way that makes cancellation by the lessor diffi cult or impossible.
The leasehold spectrum depicts these fi ve variables in a manner that also gives an indication as to their economic consequences. The further to the right, for each variable, the greater the transfer of rights from the landowner to the occupier. The further to the left, the greater the extent to which the underlying landowners have held onto their rights. This is a useful point to consider the diff erence between granting occupiers a lease and granting freehold, as can occur under the legislation recently introduced in Queensland. Of its nature, freehold (or a fee simple, the most common form of freehold) has certain fi xed characteristics -it is perpetual, no ongoing rent is paid to the former owner, it is freely transferable, unrestrictive 23 and cannot be forfeited. There is no freehold equivalent to the leasehold spectrum; all fee simple 21 While it is more common for rent to be nominal rather than zero, rent-free leases and subleases are permitted by law: Peter Butt, Land Law (Lawbook Co, 6 th ed, 2010) 276. 22 The term 'market rent' is being used here broadly, in that in most remote Aboriginal communities there is no conventional market for land, rather a single landowner setting the rent for all properties in the community. 23 Freehold can be subject to restrictions in the form of freehold covenants / restrictive covenants.
Freehold covenants are relatively uncommon. There are also limits on the matters they may address: see Butt, above n 21, ch 17.
ownership tends to have the same features. 24 This is illustrated in Diagram Two, which compares the range of outcomes that are available under leasehold with the fi xed outcomes that occur under a fee simple. Depending on the desired outcome, this fl exibility can be a potential advantage of using leasehold ownership.
25 A lease can range from being short-term and restrictive, through to something that approximates freehold ownership, depending on the economic model being implemented. sits towards the left of the spectrum. Under an occupier-driven approach, the focus is instead upon providing the occupiers with a valuable set of property rights that they can exploit to their benefi t, such as a freehold or lease towards the right of the spectrum. There is of course a tension between the two approaches -it is not possible to simply do both. Most government statements convey the impression that township leasing is being used to introduce an occupier-driven approach.
The following section, which identifi es outcomes under the Wurrumiyanga township lease, shows that this is not the case. While there is variation between the diff erent types of infrastructure, for the most part township leases have been used to implement a landowner-driven approach to development.
III WURRUMIYANGA TOWNSHIP LEASE
A 27 Most Aboriginal land in the Northern Territory has been unaff ected by recent reforms. This is because those reforms have focused on residential communities, particularly larger communities. In the Northern Territory, there are 52 communities on ALRA land that generally have a population of more than 100. It is these communities that are the target of township leasing. While they encompass only a small fraction of all ALRA land, these communities are highly important as they are the places where most people live.
It is described above how residential communities on Aboriginal land typically contain a range of buildings -such as houses, offi ces, council depots, schools and stores -and in the past most of those buildings were installed without the occupiers obtaining a grant of formal rights, such as a lease. The result was that people and organisations occupied infrastructure under informal tenure arrangements.
28 At its most basic, a township lease is one model for introducing formal tenure arrangements into such communities, through a headlease and sublease structure. The township lease itself is a long-term, community-wide headlease, and until recently all township leases were held by a body called the Table 9A .2.1. Exclusive and non-exclusive native title covers a further 9.1 per cent of the Territory, see Table 9A .2.3. 27 0.5 per cent of NSW is Indigenous land while a further 0.1 per cent is subject to exclusive or nonexclusive native title: see ibid. 28 There were exceptions, in that some infrastructure was leased and certain other infrastructure occupied by government departments and missions was subject to a statutory right of occupancy. The historical tenure arrangements in communities on Aboriginal land are described in detail at Terrill, Beyond Communal and Individual Ownership, above n 4, ch 4. Executive Director of Township Leasing ('EDTL'). 29 The EDTL then grants subleases over portions of the community to each occupier. Where it collects rent on a sublease, the EDTL fi rst deducts its expenses and then pays the balance to the landowners, the traditional Aboriginal owners.
A key feature of township leasing has been the role played by the EDTL. It has always been possible for the owners of ALRA land to grant leases directly to occupiers, however the Australian government argues that this takes too long and that once a township lease is in place the EDTL can manage the process more effi ciently. The major Aboriginal land councils disagree. Pointing to the fact that thousands of lots have been leased directly to occupiers in the last few years, they argue that direct leasing to occupiers can be just as effi cient.
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The land councils have also expressed concern about the fact that township leases have shifted control over decision-making from the Aboriginal landowners to the EDTL.
31 This is one reason why -despite considerable eff ort by the Australian government -there have been so few township leases. Until recently, only three township leases had been granted, all of which were located on the offshore islands. In the fi rst decade of the reforms, there were no township leases on the mainland in the regions administered by the two larger land councils, the Northern Land Council and Central Land Council.
The reason this has changed recently is because there has been a signifi cant shift in government policy. In 2015, the government announced that it would agree to a township lease being held by a 'community entity' rather than the EDTL. 32 . This means that for the fi rst time an Aboriginal organisation, rather than a government statutory body, will hold the headlease and manage the formalisation process. The policy shift has resulted in three further communities agreeing to a township lease: at Gunyangara, 33 Mutitjulu 34 and Pirlangimpi. 35 The township lease at Gunyangara will be held by a corporation representing the Gumatj traditional owners, while the Mutitjulu and Pirlangimpi leases will initially be held by the EDTL with provision made for transfer to a community entity when a corporation has been created that is willing and able to take on the role. June 2017) https://ministers.pmc.gov.au/scullion/2017/celebrations-tiwi-islands-township-leasingoutcomes>. For both Mutitjulu and Pirlangimpi, the township lease will initially be held by the EDTL but provision has been made for it to be transferred to a community organisation when a corporation has been created that is willing and able to take on the role. This issue of control over decision making is of considerable signifi cance, but is not the focus of this article. This article is instead concerned with the subleases that have been granted to occupiers, and more particularly to whom they have been granted and upon what terms, with a view to considering the consequences of this for economic development in aff ected communities. This will continue to be an important issue, regardless of who holds the township lease itself.
B The Wurrumiyanga Community
The fi rst ever township lease was granted over the community of Wurrumiyanga on 30 August 2007. Formerly called Nguiu, Wurrumiyanga is situated on Bathurst Island, part of the Tiwi Islands off the coast of the Northern Territory to the north of Darwin. It has a population of between 1265 and 1582 people, 36 most of whom are Tiwi, making it one of the largest remote Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. It is the most useful site for a case study of township subleasing practices because it is the community in which implementation of the reforms is most advanced. While it took several years, the process of granting subleases to occupiers is now substantially complete. From reports produced by the offi ce of the EDTL, it appears that same approach to subleasing is being followed in all other township lease communities.
It is described above how not all Aboriginal people who live in residential communities on Aboriginal land are necessarily traditional owners for that particular country. Wurrumiyanga provides an example of this dynamic. In the course of granting the township lease, the regional Aboriginal land council published a list of 250 people who it identifi ed as being the traditional owners for the land on which the community sits. 37 This means that most Aboriginal people living in Wurrumiyanga are not traditional owners for that land. It needs to be emphasised that the relationship between residence and traditional ownership is complicated and the distinction is not clear-cut. Long-term residence might lead to a person acquiring some rights to the land under traditional law, particularly in some regions. Further, the proportion of residents who are also traditional owners will vary considerably between communities.
One reason this matters is because the ALRA is one of several Australian land rights schemes that provide for ownership of land by the traditional owners (rather than Aboriginal residents as a group).
38 Consequently, when decisions are made about whether to implement a landowner-driven or occupier-driven approach to economic development, this impacts on not just on the overall level of development, and how it occurs, but also the question of which people stand to benefi t and how authority over the control of resource fl ows is allocated.
C To Whom Have Subleases Been Granted?
In order to explain, in an intelligible manner, to whom subleases have been granted, this section follows the practice of dividing the composition of communities into three categories: residential housing, service providers and enterprises. While not always neat, this distinction helps clarify the make-up of communities and also corresponds with diff erences in the approach that has been taken to subleasing. During public debate about land reform, it has been said on a number of occasions that township leasing would lead to ownership of property by individuals. For example, former Minister for Indigenous Aff airs, Mal Brough, told Parliament that township leasing would create 'a new tenure system for townships on Aboriginal land' that would 'make it signifi cantly easier for individuals to own their own homes and establish businesses'. 41 In a similar vein, John Howard had earlier argued that Indigenous Australians 'should be able to aspire to owning their own home and having their own business' as having 'title to something is the key to your sense of individuality, it's the key to your capacity to achieve, and to care for your family '. 42 In practice, township leasing has not led to ownership of businesses by individuals. It has been accompanied by some home ownership, but only in small numbers. In Wurrumiyanga, there are now 16 houses owned by Tiwi families whereas previously there were none. 43 The introduction of home ownership in Wurrumiyanga has been discussed elsewhere, 44 however it is noted here that these 16 grants represent the outcome of a multi-million dollar program. They are not the simple consequence of having a township lease, and there are no reports of home ownership in any of the other communities with a township lease. 45 47 This suggests that some saturation point has initially been reached, at least while further work is done on the full range of barriers to home ownership in remote communities.
Again, there have been no subleases to individuals beyond these few grants of home ownership. All enterprise subleases are held by corporations and collectives. Nor has there been a shift from 'non-profi t community-based businesses' to 'profi t-making businesses', as Warren Mundine has argued for. 48 For the most part, ownership of enterprises has not changed. The same organisations continue to conduct their businesses, now under a sublease.
The exception to this -and it is a signifi cant exception -is that a body called Mantiyupwi Pty Ltd has acquired 10 township subleases. Mantiyupwi is an investment body that is owned by the traditional owners of the land on which the community is situated.
49 As no ted above, in Wurrumiyanga traditional owners are less than one fi fth of all community residents (this ratio varies between communities). The subleases to Mantiyupwi refl ect the way in which they have used the township leasing process, including the up-front rent they received, to increase their economic stake in the community. 50 In the past, it is more likely that such collective businesses would have been owned by an organisation representing the entire community.
It was also suggested during debate about land reform that township leasing might lead to an infl ux of new businesses, even to the extent that communities are transformed. For example, David Tollner said that under earlier arrangements 'nowhere do you see bakeries. You do not see hairdressers; you do not see clothing stores -let alone a McDonald's or an Irish theme pub', 51 while the 'normalisation of townships and the creation of long-term leases on towns will enable Aboriginal people and others to buy land and build houses … [i]t will allow businesses to set up'.
52 Diagram Three illustrates the extent to which the economies of remote Aboriginal communities are dominated by government-funded service providers. There are only 27 lots subject to an enterprise sublease, as opposed to 93 lots subleased to a service provider and 281 lots subleased to Territory Housing. Township leasing has permanently altered arrangements around land use, and developments accompanying the introduction of township leasing have led to In several respects, the home ownership subleases -that is, the 16 subleases granted to Aboriginal residents under a home ownership scheme -are diff erent to all other township subleases. As depicted below, they are the most freeholdlike, in that they provide occupiers with a commodifi able set of property rights, particularly to the extent that they are long-term and rent-free. ). Further, they cannot be sold where to do so would mean that the non-Tiwi population of Wurrumiyanga exceeds 15 per cent (Annexure A, item A.5), although this is not currently an issue as the non-Tiwi population is below 10 per cent. 54 There is also a range of other restrictions on use. The sublease holder must maintain certain insurance (clause 16), allow the EDTL to enter the premises to conduct inspections (clause 8.2), must only use the land for the purpose of a residential dwelling (clause 9.1) and where requested must remove certain improvements upon expiration of the sublease (clause 20.10). The sublease can also be terminated where the sublease holder abandons the property (clause 20.5). Despite these restrictions, the home ownership subleases are appropriately structured as a form of property to enable them to be mortgaged. All have been mortgaged to Indigenous Business Australia, which provides the home loans under the Indigenous Home Ownership program. Beyond home ownership, other areas of residential housing have been subleased long-term to Territory Housing, the Northern Territory government's public housing provider. Territory Housing then issues residents with tenancy agreements under which they are required to adhere to public housing standards or face eviction. This is not an economic development measure, rather the implementation of a new, stricter and more formalised housing management regime, a development that aff ects all larger communities on Aboriginal land and not just township lease communities. 56 The rent paid by residents of public housing does not fl ow through to the Aboriginal landowners; it is retained by Territory Housing for housing management. The sublease between EDTL and Territory Housing is itself rent-free, as this was the government policy at the time the sublease was granted.
3 What is the Form of Tenure Granted to Businesses?
Of greater interest for an article on economic development is the form of tenure granted to businesses. The emergence of new enterprises in Wurrumiyanga has been impressive, in a way that is not immediately apparent from the list of subleases provided in Diagram Three. The land council and the traditional owners have used the township leasing process to set in train a number of developments. This is not entirely new: Tiwi landowners have a history of pursuing economic development opportunities, with the assistance of the land council, most notably through an acacia plantation on the islands. 58 In the period since the township lease, they have increased their commercial activities within the Wurrumiyanga township, which is new. This has included:
• purchasing an established business called Tiwi Tours;
• entering into a joint venture with respect to a takeaway store;
• acquiring three facilities that provide accommodation to visitors;
• establishing a car-rental business; The fi rst is rent. Upon grant of the township lease, the Australian government paid the traditional owners an up-front rental payment of $5 000 000.
61 This is a considerable sum of money, and unlike most government payments the traditional owners were able to use it in any way they chose. For the most part, they chose to invest it. It appears that the up-front rent enabled the traditional owners to purchase Tiwi Tours and the tip-truck and to construct a house as part of the joint venture with respect to the take away store. It also appears that the rent facilitated or helped with the acquisition of the accommodation facilities and the construction of a shopping centre.
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A second factor is diffi cult to quantify or assess, which is that of advice and leadership. It appears that there has been strong leadership from senior traditional owners with respect to pursuing commercial opportunities. Traditional owners have also received assistance with their investments from the land council and from the EDTL. These sorts of investments require expertise that is not always available in remote communities. Some of the developments -such as the construction of the supermarket complex and the acquisition of accommodation facilities -required a high level of strategy and planning.
A third factor is that the Northern Territory Emergency Response and the Strategic Indigenous Housing and Infrastructure Program ('SIHIP') led to a sharp increase in government spending between 2007 and 2011. This is refl ected in visitor numbers to the community, which went from around 2500 in 64 and underleased one area to the Territory Alliance Partners to construct a camp under an arrangement that gave them fi rst option to purchase the assets from the Northern Territory government once construction had been fi nalised. 65 This also relied on the government being receptive to this form of development, which has not always been the case.
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The fourth factor -which is the focus of this article -is changes to land tenure as a result of the township lease. Previously, the usual practice was for enterprises not to have a lease or sublease. They occupied the infrastructure that they had built or been allocated under informal arrangements. Now they all hold a sublease, and the following All but one of these enterprise subleases (see below) are subject to a rent-review clause under which every fi ve years the parties must either agree on a new amount or ask the president of the Australian Property Institute to determine the 'open market rental value' of the premises, whose determination then binds the parties. This suggests that the rent for all of these subleases is, or over time will become, market rent. 68 The enterprise subleases also utilise a set of standard terms and conditions in a similar manner to the home ownership subleases described above. They can only be used for the identifi ed permitted use, and may only be sold, underleased or otherwise transferred to another with the consent of the landowners and the EDTL (clause 9). There are several other restrictions on use, including a requirement that sublease holders maintain improvements (clause 27).
On a number of occasions, the government has argued that part of the economic value of township leases is that they lead to long-term and transferable subleases. The White Paper on Developing Northern Australia refers to township leasing as one option for facilitating 'the tradability and bankability of rights and interests in Aboriginal land '. 69 In the course of explaining the value of township leasing, Nigel Scullion has referred to the need for 'long term and transferable subleases' of the type that 'you or I could go to the bank with and get mortgage on'.
70 More broadly, under its 'Jobs, Land and Economy Programme' the government seeks to fund activities 'that support long-term, tradable tenure'. 71 These statements suggest that subleases granted to enterprises under a township lease are similar to leases found in the Australian Capital Territory: long-term, transferable and freehold-like. That is not the case. The terms of these enterprise 68 Information included in some of the subleases suggests that the tenants have initially been given a grace period of below-market rental until the fi rst review, particularly the subleases to Nguiu Ullintjinni and the Nguiu Club where it appears likely that the amount of rent will increase after review. This may have now occurred: as described below at n 80, the township lease revenue for Wurrumiyanga increased signifi cantly in 2015-16. The updated rental fi gures are not on the public record. 69 Australian Government, 'Our North, Our Future', above n 1, 31. subleases are more like a retail lease that might be found in a shopping centre. In terms of the leasehold spectrum, the average enterprise sublease can be depicted as follows: In other words, and in contrast to the home ownership subleases, they have not been designed in a way that facilitates their 'tradability and bankability'. The focus is instead upon providing landowners with rent and a degree of ongoing control. In 2010, then Coordinator-General for Remote Services, Bob Beadman, provided a copy of the standard sublease terms to the Commonwealth Bank and sought advice on their suitability for a mortgage. He was advised that the sublease terms were 'so onerous at [sic] to make the [sub]lease near to valueless and arguably it becomes a business liability rather than an asset'. 72 The above diagram illustrates why this is the case.
For the most part, those subleases have not been mortgaged or used as collateral for a loan. There is an exception: as the government and the EDTL have pointed out, 73 part of the funds for the supermarket complex were provided through a commercial loan from Westpac bank that was secured by a mortgage. The mortgage covers three subleases, the supermarket complex and two other buildings used for 'offi ce and staff accommodation' and 'short term accommodation' (those subleases marked with an asterisk in the table at Diagram Five). This indicates that Westpac was of the view that the subleases were not a liability, that despite the obligation to pay ongoing rent they represented positive value.
It is noteworthy that the 12-year sublease for the supermarket complex is diff erent from other enterprise subleases, in that it does not contain a market rent review clause. This is signifi cant, as it is likely that the rental of $38 500 does not refl ect the full value of the sublease. The supermarket complex contains a profi table supermarket as well as four smaller retail spaces, which have been underleased to a takeaway food outlet, a laundromat, a games parlour and a credit union. 74 It is very likely that this would generate an income for the sublease holder of far more than $38 500. Other enterprise subleases have been drafted so that any increases in the value of the property are captured through the rent review process and fl ow to the landowners. There are no other mortgages of an enterprise sublease in Wurrumiyanga, and no reports from other township lease communities. The arrangements for the supermarket complex appear to be exceptionalpresumably because the sublease holder is Mantiyupwi, which is owned by the traditional owners -rather than representing the fi rst example of what will become a widespread practice. What is actually widespread is the practice of using the subleasing process to generate income for the landowners.
It must be noted that a similar approach to leasing is being taken in communities on Aboriginal land that do not have a township lease. As a result of the recent changes in government policy, and pressure on landowners to grant more leases, enterprises in communities on Aboriginal land across the Northern Territory are expected to sign up to leases and pay 'fair rent '. 75 This refl ects a key element of the new approach that is being taken to land tenure in communities on Aboriginal land. Traditional owners are being given greater social license to exploit their landownership for commercial gain, something that in the past was generally not considered appropriate inside of residential communities.
IV COMPARING THE TWO APPROACHES A Which Is the Best Approach to Land Reform? A
There is legitimate scope for debate about whether a landowner-driven approach or an occupier-driven approach is better suited to the needs and circumstances of remote communities on Indigenous land. While township leasing and related reforms have been underway for a decade, we have never had such a debate. This section considers, in broad terms, some of the consequences of diff erent approaches. It is acknowledged here that the terms 'landowner-driven' and 'occupier-driven' development are simplifi cations. The leasehold spectrum makes clear how there is a range of possibilities and the potential for mixed outcomes: for example, a lease might be long-term and rent-free, but inalienable. There is nevertheless a fundamental tension between the two approaches. It is also the case that the preferred approach will diff er, depending as it does on the preferences and circumstances of each community and the type of infrastructure under consideration. Already in Wurrumiyanga there is a mixture: home ownership subleases refl ect an occupier-driven approach while other subleases are more consistent with a landowner-driven approach.
To be clear, this is not a situation where the outcome can be left to 'market forces' or for Aboriginal people to decide for themselves. The role of Aboriginal landowners and Aboriginal community residents in the decision-making process d is critical; the importance of this cannot be understated. However, it is neither possible nor desirable to simply 'leave it to them'. Governments and organisations such as Aboriginal land councils are inextricably involved. The approach that they take to applying for or requiring (sub)leases, to agreeing to or requiring rent, to deciding which communities are eligible for home ownership programs and which communities will receive funding -these will heavily infl uence, if not shape, the outcome. In such circumstances, purporting to 'leave it to the community' can conceal the infl uence that governments and other organisations have. This is also a complex and novel situation, one in which any community would benefi t from access to the best available information and advice. Further, this article demonstrates how at times there is the potential for confl ict between the interests of traditional landowners and non-landowner residents. Where it occurs, the approach taken by outsiders will infl uence the resolution (or exacerbation) of this confl ict.
B A Landowner-Driven Approach to Economic Growth
Under a landowner-driven approach, the focus is on obtaining an economic return for the landowners, primarily through rent. For the past few decades, most businesses and organisations that operated in Aboriginal communities did not pay rent for the land they occupied. In Wurrumiyanga, for example, prior to the township lease the landowners were receiving just $2000 per year from rent on leases within the community. 76 This has changed dramatically. Since 2013, the offi ce of the EDTL has been publishing the amount of revenue it collects each year in its annual reports. Initially, that rent went towards repaying the $5 000 000 up-front payment that was made to landowners upon grant of the township lease. That amount has now been repaid, which means that future rent will be 'disbursed to organisations nominated by the Mantiyupwi Traditional Owners for their ongoing economic and social development'.
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Rent is a source of income for landowners and an additional cost for occupiers, and some of the consequences of this are explored below. It must be noted that the introduction of rent is a development that extends beyond township leases: in communities on Aboriginal land across the Territory, there has been a signifi cant increase in the amount of rent being collected. There is no research or published reports that detail whether rental rates are higher or lower in communities with a township lease. And while the amount of rent is not inconsiderable, it is also necessary to put these fi gures in context. Wurrumiyanga is one of the largest communities on Aboriginal land, with a population of between 1265 and 1582 and around 250 traditional owners. 83 In most other communities the rent will be less. This rent is not enough to completely change the economic environment, and it will take considerable skill to use/invest it in a way that has a real impact. Conversely, the extent of the additional cost to occupiers should not be overstated. Many of the enterprises described above are paying just a few thousand dollars a year in rent. 84 In some cases it is much larger, however this appears to be for enterprises (the social club, the store and café) that are more profi table.
Rent as Landowner Income (a) The Different Uses towards Which Rent Can Be Put
Rent is paid to the Aboriginal landowners collectively. In general terms, they then have a choice whether to invest it, to use it on community projects or to distribute it to individuals and families. Diff erent issues arise in each case. Where rent is invested, then (depending on the availability of suitable investments) the landowners will receive further returns down the track. As the experience in Wurrumiyanga demonstrates, investment can also occur in ways that have other impacts. The landowners have invested in enterprises in the community, creating the opportunity for jobs and for individuals to acquire greater skills and expertise. Such investments can also result in community residents having access to facilities and services that were not available previously.
Where rent is used on community projects -such as support for sporting clubs, schools, art centres, outstations and infrastructure such as basketball courts and workshops -there is again a clear benefi t to the community. It is not known what percentage of the Wurrumiyanga rent has been used on community projects (and this might be regarded as confi dential). Further south, the Central Land Council has reported that between 50 and 100 per cent of the rent that landowners received for the 'fi ve-year leases' (introduced as part of the Northern Territory Emergency Response) will be applied to community benefi t projects. 85 It is not just the organisations receiving funds that benefi t from these processes: where done well, the processes associated with selecting and implementing projects can provide opportunities for community planning, the expression of autonomy and Payments from the landowning group to individuals can take a number of forms. At their simplest, they can be distributions of cash or other benefi ts -a practice that has historically been common with respect to royalties and other payments on Aboriginal land. They can also be targeted at particular categories of need: where, for example, payments are made to 'sick and elderly family members' or 'to students and patients travelling interstate'.
(b) The Characterisation of Rent
One issue here is whether or not rent should be characterised as a constructive form of income. Debate about welfare dependence and the long-term impact of transfer payments and subsidised benefi ts in Aboriginal communities has popularised the concern that some forms of income can be harmful as well as helpful, an idea captured by terms such as 'harmful welfare'. It has been argued by some that paying rent and other royalties to Aboriginal landowners is another form of harmful welfare. For example, Beadman has argued that rent on township subleases creates 'a passive "royalty" fl ow for Traditional Owners' rather than facilitating 'a property market for the long-term benefi t of all residents'.
88 Nicolas Peterson asks: 'Should the traditional owners of the townships be turned into a rentier class or should their interests be bought out?' 89 In a related context, Andrew Forrest has argued that making untied payments to Aboriginal organisations under native title agreements is a form of 'mining welfare' and 'part of the welfare cycle'.
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Such statements clearly have the potential to be politically disempowering for Aboriginal landowners. They also appear to correlate the making of payments to Aboriginal organisations with the distribution of those payments to individuals and families. That has been widespread but is not always the case. And as the previous section makes clear, untied payments to Aboriginal organisations can also be empowering and have positive fl ow-on eff ects for communities. The 'harmful welfare' characterisation of rent is not a straightforward matter. Further, and as discussed below, it is likely to be collective Aboriginal organisations that benefi t most from an occupier-driven approach, rather than individuals. The complex issue of how individuals benefi t from the profi ts of collective organisations will arise in that context as well. 
Rent as an Additional Expense for Occupiers
On the other side of the equation, rent has increased the costs of doing business in communities on Aboriginal land for enterprises and for services providers. A signifi cant portion of that rent in Wurrumiyanga has been paid by a few key enterprises (the social club and store/café), while around half has been paid for by service providers rather than enterprises. 91 For most enterprises, the amount of rent is small relative to the other costs of operating in a remote community. While it is possible that that rent might lead to a reduction in commercial investment, currently that risk appears to be small. It is nevertheless possible that rent will have an impact on the development of new enterprises, particularly where the margins are slim. If one aim of land reform is to make it easier for individuals and families to set up enterprises such as a clothes store, hairdresser or laundromat, the imposition of rent makes this more diffi cult, not easier. This could be avoided through the creation of enterprise zones, an issue discussed further below.
As well as being an additional cost, rent makes it signifi cantly more diffi cult for occupiers to use their sublease as collateral for a loan. Where rent is above a certain level, a sublease will not be sold for a premium because a prospective purchase will regard the ongoing rental obligations as being equal to or greater than the value of the sublease. And where there is little or no chance of it being sold for a premium, a sublease will not be mortgaged. That is one reason why it is misleading when the Australian government states that township leasing delivers 'long-term tradeable tenure to underpin commercial activities' and 'makes it possible for individuals to obtain long-term subleases to support a loan '. 92 This is not what happens for the majority of enterprises on a township lease. The next section considers whether enterprises would be likely to use their properties as collateral, even if they were provided with 'long-term, tradable tenure'.
C An Occupier-Driven Approach to Economic Growth
Under an occupier-driven approach, the focus is instead on making it easier to establish and grow enterprises in communities on Aboriginal land by providing people and/or organisations with access to land and a form of property rights that suit their business needs. This, it must be said, is a little complicated. It is clear that an occupier-driven approach is facilitated where the processes for obtaining access to land are quick and uncomplicated, where access to land is cheap, where property rights are long-term and secure and, in some circumstances, where property rights are tradeable such that they can be used as collateral for a loan. What is less clear is how these aims are best achieved in a particular environment, including the question of when an open land market will achieve better outcomes than centralised processes for the allocation and re-allocation of land. land markets. That does not mean that such markets are equally suited to the very particular economic, demographic and cultural circumstances of remote communities on Indigenous land. Rather than get bogged down in the mechanics of enabling an occupier-driven approach, the discussion here focuses on the use of land as collateral and the potential for enterprise zones.
The Use of Land as Collateral
An issue that is often raised in this context is that of supporting economic growth by enabling land to be used as collateral for a loan. The discussion provided earlier gives some indication of the sort of lease or sublease that is required for this to occur: one that is not just transferable, but also suffi ciently long-term, where the level of rent and other restrictions is such that the lease or sublease is seen as representing positive value rather than a liability. In simple terms, this suggests a lease or sublease to the right of a leasehold spectrum, or a grant of freehold.
It is clear, however, that the extent to which occupiers are able to 'leverage' their property rights depends not just on the nature of those rights but also on market conditions. It is here that a dose of realism is required when discussing remote communities with low income levels and a high reliance on government funding. In Wurrumiyanga, currently most enterprises hold restrictive subleases under which they pay market rent. However, even if those subleases were freehold-like in every respect it is not at all clear that they would be used as collateral for a loan, and that the proceeds of such a loan would then be used to fund new business activities. In fact, such an outcome is optimistic. 93 The key point is that market conditions impose real constraints on the ability of an occupier-driven approach to deliver benefi ts to enterprises and to the community.
The Potential for Economic Zones
On the other hand, a targeted approach to supporting enterprise development might have a real impact on the lives on of least some residents. It is described above how the construction of a new supermarket complex in Wurrumiyanga led to four new retail spaces. It appears that the tenants of those shops are required to pay rent to Mantiyupwi. An alternative might be to make such spaces available at low cost to Aboriginal residents or organisations wishing to start a business.
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Initially they would not require a tradable sublease that could be used as collateral; more important would be a sublease that is low cost and suffi ciently long-term. Where the aim to is to encourage ownership of businesses by individuals, or small-scale local enterprises, a targeted approach involving support for the construction of appropriate infrastructure and the grant of leases or subleases on accommodating terms is likely to be more eff ective than the wholesale or community-wide reliance on a particular form of tenure or a naïve reliance on the introduction of 'land markets'. 93 See Terrill, Beyond Communal and Individual Ownership, above n 4, This would of course require landowner agreement.
V DISCUSSION
A Impact on Overall Levels of Economic Activity
The table of Wurrumiyanga subleases in Diagram Three of this article provides a snapshot of the nature of economic activity in the community. There are 297 lots allocated to housing, 93 to service providers and just 27 to enterprises. It is enterprises that are the focus of an occupier-driven approach to development, and they are a small portion of the community. Providing service providers with a fee simple or a freehold-like lease or sublease will not have a direct or immediate impact on economic development. On the other hand, charging service providers rent does have such an impact. It provides an income stream for landowners that might be used to facilitate further developments. From the fi gures above it appears that the rent paid by service providers has been around half of all rent for Wurrumiyanga.
Of course, that rent has to come from somewhere. Nearly all service providers in Aboriginal communities are either government departments or governmentfunded NGOs, and so this rent is provided out of government funding. In the past governments have refused to pay rent for the use of land in Aboriginal communities and one of the biggest changes of the last decade has been that they are now willing to do so. The question of whether they should might be debated: the point for present purposes is that for service providers, taking a landowner-driven approach to development will have a more signifi cant and direct impact on the level of economic activity in communities than would an occupier-driven approach.
For enterprises, the situation is more equivocal. The introduction of rent means that landowners receive a portion of income or profi ts, albeit a relatively small portion, and enterprise owners receive less. It is also means that occupiers are less able to use their property rights as collateral for a loan. It is more diffi cult to state whether a landowner-driven or occupier-driven approach is likely to have the greater overall impact on levels of economic activity.
B Who Benefi ts?
A key diff erence between a landowner-driven and occupier-driven approach is with respect to who benefi ts and how benefi ts are administered. In township lease w communities, rent is ultimately paid to traditional owners rather than, for example, to community residents as a whole. In addition, traditional owners in Wurrumiyanga have used the township leasing process to increase their economic stake in the community through the acquisition and development of several enterprises. There is no evidence that traditional owners have used their position to the detriment of community residents. However, the concern of this article is with township leasing as a structure, how it might apply to other communities or in the future.
Discussing land issues in Aboriginal communities more generally, Peterson points out that 'a real danger is that a small group of traditional owners may pursue their economic self-interest to the detriment of the community'. 95 As one of Australia's most experienced anthropologists, and one with a long history of involvement in land rights, Peterson's concerns need to be taken seriously. A risk of taking a landowner driven approach to development on land that is owned traditionally is the potential for a confl ict between the interests of traditional owners and (other) residents, and for increased disputation about membership of the traditional ownership group. Where Indigenous land is owned by residents as a whole -as occurs in some other places -this particular issue does not arise.
It is also likely to remain the case that most enterprises in communities on Aboriginal land are owned collectively. The choice between a landowner-driven and occupier-driven approach is not a choice between collective and individual t ownership of resource fl ows. Collectively-owned enterprises face similar issues with respect to the distribution of benefi ts as those aff ecting collectively-owned land. The potential for particular families to manipulate leasing processes and enterprise management for their own benefi t is not avoided by taking an occupierdriven approach. A diff erence is that an occupier-driven approach will result in a greater variety of collective organisations that manage resource fl ows for the benefi t of their members.
There is a further diff erence with respect to processes. Rent is initially administered by Aboriginal land councils, which are relatively large organisations with established processes for managing and distributing payments. Those processes do vary. For Wurrumiyanga, the Tiwi Land Council has helped the traditional owners create and administer investment vehicles such as Mantiyupwi Pty Ltd. Further south, the Central Land Council's Community Development Unit works with landowners to use some rent towards community projects. At other times, land councils instead simply distribute rent to individuals or landowner corporations.
The Relationship between Culture and Economic Development
While the cultures of Aboriginal communities are constantly evolving in response to the changed circumstances in which people now fi nd themselves, it remains the case that those cultures are distinct. This impacts on the way in which economic activity occurs and is experienced. Examples of this include the persistence of sharing norms, including 'demand sharing', and practices such as asymmetrical reciprocity.
96 When land tenure reform is debated in terms of a dualism between communal and individual ownership, this lends itself to the suggestion that the impact on culture is clear. Communal property is often regarded as being more consistent with Aboriginal culture while the introduction of individual ownership has been portrayed, positively and negatively, as an agent for cultural change. As the discussion above makes clear, the relationship between land tenure reform and culture is more complicated than this. It is not a straightforward matter to argue that an occupier-driven or landowner-driven approach to development is more compatible with or better suited to the culture of remote communities. It is suggested here that far more detailed research would be required, including research of an empirical nature, before reliable conclusions could be drawn.
VI CONCLUSION
A key aim of this article is to rectify misconceptions about the way in which township leases impact on the economic circumstances of communities on Aboriginal land. It is common to fi nd statements to the eff ect that township leases deliver 'long-term tradeable tenure ', 98 or that '[b]y creating land administration arrangements that deliver transferability equivalent to freehold, township leasing can give confi dence to investors and improve the bankability of Indigenous land '. 99 This article demonstrates why such statements are misleading. The creation of 'long-term tradeable tenure' on township leases is the exception rather than the norm, particularly for enterprises. To date, there has been one reported mortgage of an enterprise sublease, which is the sublease to Mantiyupwi Pty Ltd for the new supermarket complex in Wurrumiyanga. That sublease is notable for the fact that it is diff erent to other subleases; in key respects it is not representative. Other subleases have been drafted so as to maximise returns for landowners. It is very unlikely that the mortgaging of other subleases will become widespread.
This refl ects the implementation of a particular approach to land reform, whether or not this was done consciously. In order to better understand the nature of the decisions that have been made, this article introduces the concepts of a leasehold spectrum and an occupier-driven and landowner-driven approach to development. For the most part, and contrary to what has often been suggested, existing township leases implement a landowner-driven approach. The article considers some of the consequences of this. It is not a straightforward matter to argue that one approach is in all circumstances preferable to the other, as there are benefi ts and drawbacks to each. It is suggested here that a landowner-driven approach is likely to have a bigger impact to the extent that it results in service providers paying rent. On land that is owned traditionally, a landowner-driven approach also results in one group of people (the traditional owners) acquiring a greater economic stake in the community. This is a serious development, one that requires careful consideration. That consideration is only possible if we are clear about the exact way township leases impact on economic activity in communities on Aboriginal land. 
